(King Songtsen Gampo with his wifes)According
to Tibetan annals, the first king of Tibet ruled from 127 BC, but it
was only in the seventh century AD that Tibet emerged as a unified
state and a mighty empire under Emperor Songtsen Gampo. With his rule,
an era of political and military greatness and territorial expansion
started that lasted for three centuries. The King of Nepal and the
Emperor of China offered their daughters to the Tibetan Emperor in
marriage. The wedding to the Nepalese and Chinese princesses were of
particular importance, because they played important roles in the
spread of Buddhism in Tibet. Chinese propaganda always refers to
political implications of Songtsen Gampo's wedding to the Chinese
imperial princess Wen Cheng, conveniently ignoring the Tibetan ruler's
other wives, particularly his Nepalese one, whose influence was, if
anything, greater than that of her Chinese counterpart.
Tibetan
ruler Trisong Detsen (reign: 755-797) expanded the Tibetan empire by
conquering parts of China. In 763, China's capital Chang'an (modern day
Xian) was invaded and China had to pay an annual tribute to Tibet. In
783, a treaty was concluded which laid down the borders between Tibet
and China. A pillar inscription at the foot of the Potala Palace in
Lhasa bears witness to some of these conquests.
The
peace treaty concluded between Tibet and China in 821, is of particular
importance in illustrating the nature of relations between these two
great powers of Asia. The text of this treaty, both in Tibetan and
Chinese, was inscribed on three stone pillars: one was erected in Gungu
Meru to demarcate the borders between the two nations, second in Lhasa
where it still stands, and the third in the Chinese capital of
Chang'an. Passages quoted from the pillars in the White Paper are
inaccurate and out of context, and aimed at creating the impression
that some sort of "union" resulted from the treaty. Nothing is further
from the truth, as is clear from the following principal passage of
that treaty:
Tibet and China shall abide by the frontiers of which they are now in
occupation. All to the east is the country of great China; and all to
the west is, without question, the country of great Tibet. Henceforth,
on neither side shall there be waging of war nor seizing of territory.
It
is hard to see how China can, in its White Paper, interpret these
events as showing that "the Tibetans and Hans (Chinese) had, through
marriage between royal families and meetings leading to alliances,
cemented political and kinship ties of unity and political friendship,
and formed close economic and cultural relations, laying a solid
foundation for the ultimate founding of a unified nation." In fact, the
historical records, both Tibetan and Chinese, contradict such an
interpretation and refer to separate and powerful empires.
In
the mid-ninth century, the Tibetan state fragmented into several
principalities. Tibetan attention focused on India and Nepal from where
a strong religious and cultural influence brought on a major spiritual
and intellectual renaissance.
Relations with the Mongol Emperors (1240-1350)
The
Mongol ruler Genghis Khan and his successors conquered vast territories
in Asia and Europe creating one of the largest empires the world has
ever known, stretching from the Pacific to eastern Europe. In 1207, the
Tangut empire north of Tibet fell to the advancing Mongols, and in
1271, the Mongols announced the establishment of the Mongol Yuan
Dynasty to rule the Eastern part of the Empire. By 1279, the Chinese
Song dynasty in southern China fell before the advancing armies and the
Mongols completed their conquest of China. Today, China claims the Yuan
Dynasty to be its own dynasty because, by doing so, it lays claim to
all Mongol conquests, at least in the eastern half of the Mongol Empire.
Prince
Goden, grandson of Genghis Khan, dispatched an expedition to Tibet in
1240 and invited one of Tibet's leading religious hierarchs, Sakya
Pandita Kunga Gyaltsen (1182-1251), to his court, thus establishing an
enduring Tibetan-Mongol relationship. Here began the unique cho-yon
(priest-patron) relationship. Kublai Khan, who succeeded Goden Khan,
embraced Tibetan Buddhism and adopted Drogon Choegyal Phagpa, nephew of
Sakya Pandita, as his spiritual mentor. This cho-yon relationship
resulted in Kublai adopting Buddhism as his empire's state religion,
and Phagpa became its highest spiritual authority. In gratitude, Kublai
Khan offered his Tibetan lama political authority over Tibet in 1254,
conferring various titles on him.
These
early cho-yon relationships were followed by many similar relationships
between Mongol princes or Tibetan noble families and Tibetan lamas.
This unique Central Asian relationship also formed the basis of later
relations between Manchu emperors and successive Dalai Lamas. The
cho-yon relationship itself was purely a personal one arising from the
religious devotion of the Patron for the Priest and continued to exist
even if the political status of the Patron changed. This was evident in
the Mongol-Tibetan relationship, which continued to exist even after
the fall of the Yuan Dynasty.
An
essential element of the cho-yon relationship was the protection that
the Patron provided his Lama in return, not for the latter's
allegiance, but for his religious teachings and blessings. Some cho-yon
relationships acquired important political dimensions and the Patron
was expected to provide military support to protect the Lama and his
Teaching or "church". Superiority of the protector was not implied, as
the Chinese propaganda suggests, since the lay patron was the student
and worshipper of his Lama.
When
Buddhism became the State religion in the eastern part of the Mongol
empire and the Sakya Lama (Phagpa) its highest spiritual authority, the
Mongol-Tibetan relationship could be best described in terms of mutual
interdependence. This concept provided for dual political and religious
paramountcy of the worldly emperor and the spiritual leader on the
basis of equality and interdependence. While the spiritual leader
depended on the emperor for protection and for backing in ruling Tibet,
the conquering emperor depended on the lama to provide the legitimacy
for his rule of the Mongol Empire.
It
is undeniable that Mongol Emperors spread their influence over Tibet.
But, contrary to the assertion made in the Chinese White Paper that,"In
the mid 13th century Tibet was officially incorporated into the
territory of China's Yuan Dynasty", none of the Mongol rulers ever made
any attempt to administer Tibet directly; Tibet did not even pay tax to
the Mongol Empire, and it certainly was never considered part of China
by the Mongol emperors.
Tibet
broke its political relationship with the Mongols in 1350 when the
Tibetan king, Jangchub Gyaltsen (reign: 1350-1364), replaced the Sakya
Lamas as the most powerful ruler of Tibet. Jangchub Gyaltsen did away
with Mongol influences in the Tibetan administrative system and
introduced a new and distinctly Tibetan one. He also enacted a Code of
Law (Trimyig Shelchey Cho-nga, 15 Article Code), for the administration
of justice in the kingdom. The Chinese regained their independence from
Mongol rule and established the Ming dynasty eighteen years after that.
Relations with Chinese Emperors (1368-1644)
The
White Paper claims that the Chinese Ming Dynasty "replaced the Yuan
Dynasty in China and inherited the right to rule Tibet". But, there is
no historical basis for this assertion. As shown above, the
relationship established between Mongol Khans or emperors and Tibetan
lamas predated the Mongol conquest of China. Similarly, Tibet broke
with the Mongol emperors before China regained its independence from
them. The Chinese emperors of the Ming inherited no relationship from
the Mongols. On the other hand, Mongol Khans continued to maintain
their intensive religious and cultural ties with Tibetans, often in the
form of cho-yon relationships, for centuries afterwards.
Even
if the Mongols did exercise influence in Tibet, it is still too
presumptious on the part of China to claim Mongol inheritence when an
independent Outer Mongolia exists as the only legitimate representative
of the Mongolian people and nation.
Contacts
between Tibet and Ming China were scarce and largely limited to visits
by individual lamas of various, sometimes rival, monasteries to China,
and the granting of honorific imperial titles or gifts by the Chinese
Emperor to them. These visits are recorded in Tibetan histories of the
fifteenth to seventeenth century, but there is no evidence whatsoever
of political subordination of Tibet or its rulers to China or the Ming
emperors. In its White Paper, the Chinese Government alleges that these
contacts with individual lamas demonstrate Ming authority in and over
Tibet. But since Tibet was not ruled by any of those lamas, whatever
the nature of their contacts may have been, they could not affect the
independent status of Tibet.
From
1350, Tibet was ruled by the princes of Phagmodru and then, from about
1481, by the Rinpung dynasty. In 1406, the ruling Phagmodru prince,
Dakpa Gyaltsen, turned down the Imperial invitation to him to visit
China. This clearly shows the sovereign authority of Tibetan rulers at
that time. From about 1565 until the rise to power of the Fifth Dalai
Lama in 1642 (two years before the fall of the Ming Dynasty), the kings
of Tsang ruled Tibet. There are indications of sporadic diplomatic
relations between some of these rulers and Ming emperors, but the
latter exercised neither authority nor influence over them.
In
1644, the Chinese emperors were once again overthrown by foreign
conquerors. The Manchus succeeded in establishing their own imperial
dynasty, which ruled over a large empire, the most important part of
which was China. They called it the Qing Dynasty.
Relations with the Manchus (1639-1911)
(The Great Fifth Dalai Lama)
In
1642, the Great Fifth Dalai Lama, with the help of his Mongol patron
Gushri Khan, became the supreme political and religious ruler of
unified Tibet. Since then, Tibetans accepted him as their "Gongsa
Chenpo" or "The Supreme Sovereign". His prestige was recognised far
beyond Tibet's borders.
The
Fifth Dalai Lama not only maintained a close relationship with the
Mongols but also developed close ties with the Manchu rulers. In 1639,
before the Dalai Lama acquired supreme political power and also before
the Manchu conquest of China and the establishment of the Qing Dynasty,
Manchu Emperor Tai Tsung invited the Dalai Lama to his capital, Mukden
(present-day Shenyang). Unable to accept the invitation personally, the
Dalai Lama sent his envoy who was treated with great respect by the
Emperor. Thus the Cho-yon relationship between the Dalai Lama and the
Manchu rulers was established. As was true of the Tibetan relationship
with the Mongol emperors, the links developed between Tibetans and the
Manchu emperors did not involve China. As Owen Lattimore points out in
reference to the Qing Dynasty, "What existed in fact was a Manchu
Empire, of which China formed only one part." [Studies in Frontier
History]
Having
conquered China and annexed it to the Manchu empire, Emperor Shunzi
invited the Fifth Dalai Lama in 1653 for a state visit to the Imperial
capital. In an unprecedented sign of respect, the Manchu Emperor made a
four-day journey outside his capital (Beijing) to receive the Tibetan
sovereign and foremost spiritual leader of Central Asian Buddhists.
Commenting on the Dalai Lama's visit, W.W. Rockhill, an American
scholar and diplomat in China, wrote:
(The Dalai Lama) had been treated with all the ceremony which could
have been accorded to any independent sovereign, and nothing can be
found in Chinese works to indicate that he was looked upon in any other
light; at this period of China's relations with Tibet, the temporal
power of the Lama, backed by the arms of Gusri Khan and the devotion of
all Mongolia, was not a thing for the Emperor of China to question.
[The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and Their Relations With Emperors of China,
1644-1908, T'oung Pao 11, 1910, p.37]
On
this occasion, the Fifth Dalai Lama and the Manchu Emperor bestowed
unprecedented high complimentary titles upon each other and the cho-yon
relationship was reaffirmed. In the White Paper, the Chinese Government
refers only to the honorific title given by the Emperor to the Dalai
Lama, but conveniently leaves out any mention of the similar honorific
title granted by the Dalai Lama to the Emperor. Chinese propaganda
infers that it was this deed by the Manchu Emperor which conferred the
legal right to the Dalai Lama to rule Tibet. This interpretation
intentionally misses the point of the event, namely that titles were
exchanged by two sovereign leaders. If the Dalai Lama was dependent on
his imperial title for the exercise of his authority, then so was the
Manchu Emperor dependent on the title granted by the Dalai Lama for the
exercise of his authority.
Throughout
the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) relations between Tibet and the Manchu
emperors remained formally based on the cho-yon relationship. The
Manchu Emperor readily responded to the appeals for help to drive out
invading Dzungar Mongols and escort the newly discovered Seventh Dalai
Lama to the Tibetan capital in 1720.
Manchu
forces entered Tibet on three more times in the eighteenth century,
once to protect Tibet against invading Gorkha forces from Nepal (1792),
and twice to restore order after civil wars (1728 and 1751). Each time
they came at the request of the Tibetans, and each time the cho-yon
relationship was invoked.
The
Manchus did succeed in establishing some degree of influence in Tibet
during those crisis periods. But their influence declined rapidly
afterwards, rendering them unable to play any role when Tibet fought
wars against invaders from Jammu (1841- 1842), Nepal (1855-1856), and
British India (1903-04). By the mid 19th century the Manchu Emperor's
role (and the related role of the Amban) was only nominal.
The
White Paper devotes considerable attention to Emperor Qianlong's
so-called 29-article edict, or regulations, of 1793 concerning Tibet,
and to the appointment of Ambans (ambassadors). It presents the
"regulations" as if they were an imperial order proving extensive
Manchu authority in Tibet. In reality, the 29 points were suggestions
made by the Emperor for certain reforms of the Government of Tibet
following its war with Nepal. The Ambans were not viceroys or
administrators, but were essentially ambassadors appointed to look
after Manchu interests, and to protect the Dalai Lama on behalf of the
Emperor.
In
1792, the Gorkhas of Nepal invaded Tibet following a dispute between
Tibet and Nepal and the Dalai Lama appealed to the Manchu Emperor for
help. The Emperor sent a large army which helped Tibet drive out the
Gorkhas, and mediated a treaty of peace between Tibet and Nepal. Since
this was the fourth time the Emperor was asked to send troops to fight
for the Tibetan Government, he wanted some say in Tibetan affairs in
order to prevent Tibetans from becoming involved in conflicts which
might again precipitate requests for Manchu military involvement. The
"regulations" were suggestions made in the context of the Emperor's
protector role, rather than an order from a ruler to his subjects. This
emerges clearly from the statement made by the Imperial envoy and
commander of the Manchu army, General Fu K'ang-an, to the Eighth Dalai
Lama:
The Emperor issued detailed instructions to me, the Great General, to
discuss all the points, one by one, in great length. This demonstrates
the Emperor's concern that Tibetans come to no harm and that their
welfare be ensured in perpetuity. There is no doubt that the Dalai
Lama,acknowledging his gratitude to the Emperor, will accept these
suggestions once all the points are discussed and agreed upon.However,
if the Tibetans insist on clinging to their age-old habits, the Emperor
will withdraw the Ambans and the garrison after the troops are pulled
out. Moreover, if similar incidents occur in the future, the Emperor
will have nothing to do with them. The Tibetans may, therefore, decide
for themselves as to what is in their favour and what is not or what is
heavy and what is light, and make a choice on their own. [Quoted from
Ya Han Chang's Biography of the Dalai Lamas in Bod kyi Lo rGyus Rag Rim
g-Yu Yi Preng ba, Vol 2, Published by Tibet Institute of Social
Science, Lhasa, 1991, p.316]
Rather
than accepting or rejecting the Emperor's points, Tibetans adopted some
of the 29 points which were perceived to be beneficial to them, and
disregarded those they thought to be unsuitable. As Panchen Choekyi
Nyima, the predecessor of the Late Panchen Lama, said: "Where Chinese
policy was in accordance with their own views, the Tibetans were ready
to accept the Amban's advice; but ... if this advice ran counter in any
respect to their national prejudices, the Chinese Emperor himself would
be powerless to influence them. [Diary of Capt. O'Connor, 4 September
1903]
Among
the important points of this "29-point edict" was the Emperor's
proposal for the selection of great incarnate lamas, including the
Dalai Lamas and Panchen Lamas, by drawing lots from a golden urn. This
important task, however, was the responsibility of the Tibetan
Government and high lamas, who continued to select them according to
religious traditions. Thus, already on the first occasion when the
golden urn should have been employed, namely for the selection of the
Ninth Dalai Lama in 1808, Tibetans disregarded it.
Another
important point of this "edict" was the role of Ambans. The Amban's
role resembled that of an ambassador, at times, and that of a Resident
in a classical protectorate relationship, at other times. It is best
understood in the explanation Amban Yu Tai gave in 1903 to Mortimer
Durand, the Foreign Secretary of the Government of India (as reported
by him) that, "he was only a guest in Lhasa - not a master - and he
could not put aside the real masters, and as such he had no force to
speak of." [Sir Mortimer Durand: A Biography, by Sir Percy Sykes,
London 1926, p.166] In the same sense, two Lazarist missionaries, Huc
and Gabet, who were in Lhasa in the mid-nineteenth century, described
the position of the Ambans as follows: "the Government of Tibet
resembles that of the Pope and the position occupied by the Chinese
Ambassadors was the same as that of the Austrian Ambassador at Rome."
[Decouverte du Thibet, 1845-1846, M. Huc, 1933, p.50] The reference to
"Chinese Ambassadors" is a common mistake, because the Manchu Emperors
were careful not to appoint Chinese Ambans but Manchus or Mongolians, a
fact which stressed that the appointment of the Amban was also viewed
in the context of the protector's role in the cho-yon relationship, a
relationship from which the Chinese were excluded.
The
unprecedented invasion of Tibet by Manchu troops in 1908 was a turning
point in relations between Tibet and the Manchu Emperor. Previous
imperial military expeditions had come to assist the Dalai Lama or the
Tibetan Government and at their invitation. But this time, the Manchu
Emperor attempted to establish his authority in Tibet by force, largely
in order to remove increasing British influence in Tibet. The Dalai
Lama fled to neighbouring India, and the occupation of Tibet was
short-lived. When the Manchu Emperor tried to "depose" the Dalai Lama
in 1910, the Dalai Lama declared the termination of the cho- yon
relationship. The protector had attacked his Lama and thereby violated
the very foundation of their relationship.
Resistance
to the invasion succeeded when the Manchu Empire collapsed and Tibetans
forced the occupying army to surrender. In the summer of 1912, Nepalese
mediation between Tibet and China resulted in the conclusion of the
"Three Point Agreement" providing for formal surrender and expulsion of
all remaining Imperial troops. After returning to Lhasa, the Thirteenth
Dalai Lama issued a proclamation reaffirming the independence of Tibet
on 14 February 1913.
Relations with British India (1857-1911)
Since
the end of the eighteenth Century, Britain developed a keen interest to
open up trade with Tibet. Since all the Himalayan states which were
closely linked to Lhasa had gradually been tied to British India by
means of treaties and other agreements, Tibet feared it would also lose
its independence if it did not resist British efforts to gain access to
Tibet. The Thirteenth Dalai Lama steered Tibet on an independent
course. This policy frustrated the British who feared, more than
anything, a Russian infiltration into Tibet, which would tip the
balance of power in Central Asia.
Unable
to communicate effectively with Tibet, Britain approached the Manchu
Court for assistance in forcing Tibet to cooperate. The result was the
conclusion, without Tibet's participation or knowledge, of two treaties
(1890 and 1893) between Britain and China which had provisions
regarding Tibet.
The
Tibetan Government rejected these treaties as ultra vires, and this
precipitated the British invasion of Tibet in 1903. The Manchu Emperor
did not come to the assistance of Tibet and, as noted by Amban Yu Tai,
disclaimed any responsibility for the action of the Tibetans. British
troops left Lhasa within a year, after concluding a bilateral treaty,
the Lhasa Convention, with the Tibetan Government.
The
provisions of the Lhasa Convention necessarily pre-supposed the
unrestricted sovereignty of Tibet in internal and external matters,
otherwise, Tibet could not legitimately have transferred to Britain the
powers specified in the treaty. The Lhasa Convention did not even
acknowledge the existence of any special relationship between the
Manchu Emperor and Tibet and constituted an implicit recognition by
Britain of Tibet as a state competent to conclude treaties.
In
an effort to persuade China to cooperate, Britain convinced it to sign
the Adhesion Agreement in 1906, once again, without participation of
Tibet. That agreement and the 1907 agreement concluded between Britain
and Russia, confirmed the existence of a sphere of British influence in
Tibet and introduced the concept of Chinese "suzerainty" over Tibet,
something neither Tibet, nor the Manchu Court accepted. In 1908, during
Tibet's brief invasion by the Manchu army, Britain, once again, signed
a treaty with the Manchus, with no independent Tibetan participation,
concerning trade with Tibet.
Referring to the British concept of Suzerainty, Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, explained:
Chinese suzerainty over Tibet is a constitutional fiction -a political
affectation which has only been maintained because of its convenience
to both parties. ... As a matter of fact, the two Chinese (ie, Manchu)
Ambans at Lhasa are there not as Viceroys, but as Ambassadors. [Papers
CD 1920, No.66, GoI to IO, 8 Jan. 1903. India Office Library]
Relations with India
When
India became independent in 1947, it took over the British diplomatic
Mission in Lhasa, and inherited the treaty relations of Britain with
Tibet. Its recognition of Tibet was clear from the official
communication the Indian Government sent to the Tibetan Foreign Office:
The Government of India would be glad to have an assurance that it is
the intention of the Tibetan Government to continue relations on the
existing basis until new arrangements are reached on matters that
either party may wish to take up. This is the procedure adopted by all
other countries with which India has inherited treaty relations from
His Majesty's Government. [Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and
Agreements Signed by the Governments of India and China, Vol 2, 1959,
p.39]
Self-determination
China's
White Paper speaks about its alleged "ownership" of Tibet, it discusses
broad issues relating to human rights, including social, economic and
cultural rights, but does not address the fundamental question of the
right of the Tibetan people to self-determination.
Under
international law, populations which meet the criteria of "a people",
possess the right to self-determination. Governments may not deny that
right, and must act in accordance with it. In past decades, the right
to self-determination has primarily been applied to colonial countries
and peoples, but, particularly in recent years, the right has been
applied outside the context of decolonisation also.
The
Tibetan people clearly constitute a people under international law, as
defined, among others, by the UNESCO International Meeting of Experts
on Further Study of the Concept of the Rights of Peoples. It is
difficult to conceive of a better example of a distinct people, with
all the characteristics fulfilled: commonalities in history, language,
culture, ethnicity and other manifestations of shared identity and
experience; numerousness, ie, enough persons sharing common identity
and experience to warrant recognition by the international community;
the existence of institutions to give expression and effect to these
commonalities; the will of a people to assert the right to
self-determination.
The
right to self-determination means the right of a people to "determine
their own political status and to determine their economic, social and
cultural development" free of outside interference. [International
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 1; and International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 1;] Tibetans
have been denied the exercise of this right since their country's
invasion and occupation by China. Under international law, the PRC has
the obligation to permit its exercise.
The
implementation of the right to self-determination can lead to
integration with a state, association with a state or independence, but
the choice must be made by the people exercising their right to
self-determination. This choice must be made freely, without any
interference from outside that people. Thus, it is for the Tibetan
people alone, without interference from China, to make the choice.
The
Dalai Lama has, for many years, called on China to agree on the holding
of an internationally-supervised plebiscite to determine the wishes of
the Tibetan people. This, indeed, is the most desirable approach, which
is entirely in accordance with the requirements of international law
and practice.
Recognition of Tibet's right to self-determination
In
1961, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 1723
(XVI), in which it explicitly recognised the right of the Tibetan
people to self-determination. The UN called on the PRC to cease
"practices which deprive the Tibetan people of their fundamental human
rights and freedoms, including their right to self-determination." Four
years later, in 1965, the UN General Assembly expressly reaffirmed this
resolution in UNGA Res. 2079 (XX).
Earlier,
in 1959, the first Prime Minister of independent India, Jawaharlal
Nehru, expressed his strong support for the Tibetan people's right to
self-determination. Addressing the Lok Sabha, Lower House of Indian
Parliament, he said, "the last voice in regard to Tibet should be the
voice of the people of Tibet and nobody else."
Recently,
on two separate occasions, experts on the question of rights of peoples
and international law met to consider the question of Tibet's claim to
self-determination.
The
Permanent Peoples Tribunal, which met in Strasbourg for a week to hear
extensive testimony and arguments in November 1992, found that the
Tibetans meet the generally accepted legal criteria of "a people" with
the right to self-determination and "are therefore entitled to exercise
the right to self- determination." The Tribunal concluded that "the
presence of the Chinese administration on Tibetan territory must be
considered as foreign domination of the Tibetan people." Finally, in
its Verdict, the Tribunal decided that, "the Tibetan people have from
1950 been, continuously, deprived of their right to self-
determination." [Session on Tibet, Verdict, Permanent Tribunal of
Peoples, Strasbourg, 20 Nov., 1992, pp.15 and 23, resp.]
In
an unrelated conference, several weeks later, thirty eminent
international lawyers from many countries in Europe, Africa, Asia and
the Americas - among them some of the world's foremost authorities on
self-determination - met in London for four days, to consider issues
relating to the exercise of the right to self- determination by the
Tibetan people. After extensive consideration of evidence, including
China's White Paper, and after a lively legal debate, the conference
participants concluded, in a written Statement, that:
1.
under international law the Tibetan people are entitled to the right to
self-determination, that this right "belongs to the Tibetan people" and
that "(i)t is not for the state apparatus of the PRC, or any other
nation or state, to deny the Tibetan people's right to
self-determination."
2.
"(s)ince the military action of 1949-50, Tibet has been under the alien
occupation and domination of the PRC and has been administered with the
characteristics of an oppressive colonial administration."
3.
"in the particular case of Tibet and having regard to its long history
of separate existence," the Tibetan people's claim to
self-determination, including independence, is compatible with the
principles of national unity and territorial integrity of states.
[International Lawyers' Statement on Tibet - London 1993, London, 10
Jan. 1993, pp. 6-8].
The
international conference statement called on the United Nations and the
members of the international community urgently to take measures to
promote an early implementation and realisation of the Tibetan people's
right to self-determination.
In
both discussions, that of the Peoples' Tribunal and that of the
International Lawyer's Conference, the points of view of the Chinese
Government, in particular as expressed in the White Paper, were
discussed at length and fully considered. The Chinese Government was
invited to participate in both events, but declined to do so. It did,
however, submit to the meetings for consideration the White Paper and
numerous other publications stating its point of view and arguments.
Conclusion
The
Tibetan people undoubtedly possess the right to self- determination, by
virtue of which Tibetans have the right to determine their political
status and their economic, social and cultural development. Even if
self-determination is primarily applicable to peoples under colonial
domination or occupation, Tibetans fully qualify. The time has come for
the PRC to accept its international obligations and to agree to the
holding of a plebiscite in Tibet under international supervision.
Source: www.tibet.com
